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IS BALANCE OF POWER RELEVANT IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICS?
Paul, E. V., James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st
Century. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004. 384pp. $27.95
Although this book features a number
of excellent essays, it is hard to under-
stand why it was ever written. One
would have profited more from reread-
ing Ernst Haas’s brilliant 1953 essay on
the topic (“The Balance of Power: Pre-
scription, Concept, or Propaganda,”
World Politics 5, no. 4 [July 1953], pp.
442–77).
In his introductory essay, E. V. Paul
poses several theoretical and empirical
questions about the balance of power.
However, the real issue is whether the
concept is relevant in contemporary
global politics. Frankly, I did not think
that anyone (except, perhaps, John
Mearsheimer) seriously believed that
balance of power exhibits anything
much about the real world.
Happily, the contributors to this vol-
ume reach a similar conclusion. Jack
Levy sets the tone with a rigorous and
well reasoned historical analysis. He
concludes that “the tendency to treat
the theory . . . as universal is mislead-
ing,” because of the limited “scope
conditions” in which the theory was
applied. Douglas Lemke focuses on the
utility of balance of power as defined by
Mearsheimer’s version of “offensive re-
alism” and determines that the concept
is so “vaguely stated” that he finds it
“impossible to imagine a scenario that
would be inconsistent” with it. In his
imaginative effort to add an economic
dimension to balance-of-power theory,
Mark Brawley suggests that it “is typi-
cally too parsimonious to be of great
use,” and James Wirtz concludes that
the theory cannot predict outcomes in
the post–Cold War world. Edward
Rhodes continues to flog this dead
horse, concluding that “liberalism and
nuclear weapons mean that states will
not seek to balance power.”
The regional analyses change little.
Europeans, Robert Art concludes, want
more influence on U.S. policy but are
not doing much about it; balance-
of-power theory, declares William
Wohlforth, “does not apply” to Russia
or its neighbors; Benjamin Miller can
find “no countervailing coalition . . .
against U.S. hegemony” in the Middle
East; and, according to Michael Barletta
and Harold Trinkunas, there is no
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“evidence of balance of power behavior
in Latin America in the post–Cold War
period.” Get the point?
The editors try to salvage something
from this muddle by some fanciful ad
hoc theorizing, in particular pressing us
to accept the notion of “soft balancing,”
which basically translates into arguing
that almost any opposition to a coun-
try’s policies or actions constitutes bal-
ancing behavior. The most vigorous
effort to salvage balance-of-power theory
from history’s dustbin is Christopher
Layne’s unapologetic realism, which,
while finding little empirical evidence
for balancing, nevertheless boldly pre-
dicts that it is “a pretty safe bet” that
the United States “will not be able to es-
cape the fates of previous contenders
for hegemony.” This is a bet based on
faith, not fact. The other believer is
Robert Ross, who contends that “bal-
ance of power politics has been espe-
cially pronounced in East Asia.” What
is extraordinary about Ross’s essay is
that it ignores the implications of
China’s economic growth, its integra-
tion into the world economic system,
and its escalating interdependence with
those against whom it is presumably
balancing.
Overall, this is a book of missed oppor-
tunities. Perhaps the most important is
its failure to come to grips with the sub-
jective dimension of global politics. Au-
thors repeatedly and positively invoke
Stephen Walt’s modification of balance-
of-power theory with the addition of
threat perception but fail to recognize
its importance in directing our atten-
tion to the centrality of ideas and per-
ceptions. There are hints, however, as
when Lemke discusses the key role of
the “distribution of attitudes” and
Wirtz alludes to “divergence in
perception.” Only Rhodes captures the
critical role played by the social con-
struction and reconstruction of ideas in
the declining relevance of balance of
power. In an essay that deserves greater
attention than it will receive in this vol-
ume, Rhodes succinctly captures the
degree to which balance of power has
been made obsolete by the disappear-
ance of trinitarian warfare. In the end,
we conclude with him that it “is simply
ludicrous” to assume that “every state
lives in fear of the imperial ambitions of
every other state in the present age.”
RICHARD MANSBACH
Department of Political Science
Iowa State University
Haldi, Stacy Bergstrom. Why Wars Widen: A The-
ory of Predation and Balancing. London: Frank
Cass, 2003. 198pp. $114.95
Why Wars Widen is a theoretical and
empirical analysis of why neutral states
choose to enter an ongoing great-power
war. Most international-relations schol-
arship neglects this question, choosing
instead to explain the origins of war.
Haldi, of both the Naval War College
and Gettysburg College, opens her book
with the observation that states entering
an ongoing conflict “may have interests
and policies entirely distinct from those
of the initial combatants.” The book
seeks to reveal these interests. Chapters
1 and 2 introduce the argument that
neutrals are most likely to widen great-
power wars in eras of low political cost,
when war is limited and less threaten-
ing to state survival. Moreover, when
political cost is low, widening a war is
likely to occur for predatory reasons or
to acquire strategic assets that will
1 4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2005\NWCRSU05\NWC Review Summer 2005.vp
Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:58:40 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/11
